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DISCRIMINATION LAW: REQUIREMENTS AND PREFERENCES
Falkirk Council and others v Whyte and others
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1. INTRODUCTION
In Perera v Civil Service Commission (No 2) ([1983] ICR 428, followed in Meer v London  Borough  of  Tower  Hamlets  [1988]
IRLR  399)  the  Court  of  Appeal  created  an  anomaly  in  British  discrimination  law  has  been  allowed  to  grow  and  become
established.  The facts were that Mr Perera applied for a  post  as  a  legal  assistant.   The  selection  criteria  stated  inter  alia  that
’candidates with a good command of the English language, experience  in  the  UK  and  with  British  nationality  would  be  at  an
advantage’.  Mr Perera argued that those criteria had an adverse impact on persons of his (Sri Lankan) racial group.   The  Court  of
Appeal did not get as far as that argument, holding that the selection criteria, expressed as  ’mere  preferences’  did  not  amount  to
’absolute bars’ to the job and thus fell outside of the definition of discrimination provided  by  s  1(1),  Race  Relations  Act,  which
demands that the employer applies a ’requirement or condition’.  Stephenson, LJ reasoned (at 437):
            ’...a brilliant man whose personal qualities made him  suitable  as  a  legal  assistant  might
well have been sent forward... in spite of being, perhaps, below standard on his knowledge
of English...’
That comment reveals the problem.  If a candidate has to be ’brilliant’ in order to  compensate  for
a racially based ’weakness’ then he is at a disadvantage because of  his  race.   A  ’brilliant’  black
person will obtain a post otherwise suitable for an ’average’ white person.
It was the use of the word advantage in the criteria which ensured that the advertisement did not infringe the Act.  Only  if
the advertisement were modified to read ’Candidates must have an excellent command of English...’  would  it  have  infringed  the
legislation, so the Court stated.  This is because in that modified example each criterion is promoted from a ’mere preference’  to  a
’requirement or condition’.
Clearly the aim of Britain’s discrimination legislation is to prevent racial groups and women being
put at a disadvantage.  Yet Perera stands in the way of fulfilment of that aim.
Since Perera was decided in 1983 it has been  followed  many  times  -  until  now.   In  Falkirk  Council  v  Whyte  a  Scottish
Employment Appeal Tribunal may have made history by being the first tribunal or court in Britain  expressly  to  turn  its  back  on
Perera and open the door to an overdue change to the law.
The anomaly created by Perera stems from the British definition  of  indirect  discrimination,  which  is  based  upon  the
landmark decision of the US Supreme Court in Griggs v Duke Power Co 401 US 424 (1971).  In  this  case  Duke  Power  required
either a high school diploma or the passing of intelligence tests as conditions of employment, transfer or promotion.   Consequently
a disproportionate number of blacks were rendered ineligible for employment, transfer or promotion, as the  case  may  have  been.
These requirements could not be shown to be related to  job  performance.   Section  703(a)  of  Title  VII,  Civil  Rights  Act  1964
provided that it was unlawful employment practice for an employer to limit, segregate, or classify  employees  to  deprive  them  of
employment opportunities or adversely to affect their status because of race, colour, religion, sex, or national origin.   However  no
definition of discrimination was provided by the legislation.  Further, s. 703(h) authorised the use of any  professionally  developed
ability test, provided that it was not ’designed, intended, or used to discriminate because of race....’  In  their  defence  Duke  Power
showed that they had not intended that the tests should have a disparate impact on blacks.  However the Supreme court held that  s.
703 only allowed ability tests so far as they could be shown to be related to job  performance.   As  the  employer  could  not  show
that, they were unlawful.  This was so even though the employer did not intend to discriminate.  In delivering the  judgment  of  the
court Burger, CJ gave a classic account of the reasoning of indirect discrimination (at 429):
            ’Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for  employment  or  promotion  may  not
provide equality of opportunity merely in the sense of the fabled offer of milk to  the  stork
and the fox.  On the contrary, Congress has now required that the posture and condition  of
the job-seeker be taken into account.  It has - to resort again to the fable - provided that the
vessel in which the milk is proffered be one all seekers can  use.   The  Act  proscribes  not
only overt discrimination but also practices  that  are  fair  in  form,  but  discriminatory  in
operation.   The  touchstone  is  business  necessity.   If  an   employment   practice   which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice
is prohibited.’
This has become known as disparate impact theory.  The British definition of indirect discrimination is  based  upon  this
theory.  It can be seen that the theory rests upon two broad limbs.   First,  the  claimant  must  show  that  a  practice  has  led  to  an
adverse impact on a protected group.  For example  where  a  high  school  diploma  is  a  condition  of  employment  and  a  higher
proportion of whites than blacks complete high school.  Second, the burden shifts to the defendant to  prove  that  the  practice  was
necessary to achieve the aim.  For instance, was a high school diploma necessary to perform the job?  Note where  the  burden  lies
for each element.
The inclusion of provisions for indirect discrimination in Britain’s legislation is a  direct  result  of
the then (Labour) Home Secretary’s (Roy Jenkins, now  Lord  Jenkins  of  Hillhead)  discovery  of
Griggs whilst on a trip to the United States.  Mr Jenkins, upon his return, introduced section 1(1)(b) (indirect discrimination)  in  a
late amendment to the 1975 Sex Discrimination Bill.  A definition of indirect discrimination was included in the  Bill  and  became
law.  That last  minute  inclusion  explains  why  the  White  Paper  (Equality  for  Women  Cmnd  5724)  which  preceded  the  Bill
contained no indication of the Government’s understanding of, and policy towards, indirect discrimination.
A year later the same definition was  included  in  the  Race  Relations  Act  1976.   This  time  the
respective White Paper, Race Relations (Cmnd. 6234), included some indication of the Government’s aims in  introducing
indirect discrimination laws.  However, the imprecise use of language in that  document  made  matters  no  clearer.   This  perhaps
reflected the Government’s failure to foresee  the  general  lack  of  enthusiasm  that  the  judiciary  would  have  for  implementing
indirect discrimination law.
The White Paper on Race Relations stated that direct discrimination laws alone could not address the ’practices and
procedures which have a discriminatory effect’ and ’practices which are fair in a formal sense but discriminatory in their  operation
and effect’ (at para 35).  Clearly the sentiment here can be traced  to  Griggs.  Further  on  the  Government  outlined  the  intended
legislation.  In place of the words ’practice and procedure’, one finds ’requirement and condition’  (at  para  55).   It  is  this  phrase
which is at the root of the anomaly, and has been used by the Court of Appeal to narrow considerably the scope of the Act.
When the American two-limbed theory (see Griggs, above) of indirect  discrimination  was  translated  into  British
legislation, (ie Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and Race Relations Act 1976, and  by  a  1989  amendment,  s.  16,  Fair  Employment
(Northern Ireland) Act 1976) more detail was added.  The same formula, with necessary adjustments, was used in s.  1(1)(b),  Race
Relations Act and s. 16 Fair Employment (NI) Act.
Section 1(1)(b), SDA defines indirect discrimination thus:
’1(1) A person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant
for the purposes of this Act if -
(a)...
(b)            he applies to her a requirement or condition which he applies or would apply equally to a man but,
(i)         which is such that  the  proportion  of  women  who  can  comply  with  it  is  considerably
smaller than the proportion of men who can comply with it, and
(ii)        which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the sex of the person to  whom  it  is
applied, and
(iii)      which is to her detriment because she cannot comply with it.’
In broad terms that means that to make out a case the complainant  would  have  to  show  that  the
employer applied an apparently  neutral  requirement  which  had  a  disparate  impact  on  women
(including the complainant) and was not justified.
2. WHYTE AT FIRST INSTANCE
In Whyte the  appellant  employer  advertised  a  post  of  first-level  line  manager.   One  of  the  selection  criteria  stated  that
’management training and supervisory experience’ was ’desirable’.  The three  respondent  complainants  each  made  unsuccessful
applications for the post.  They alleged that the criterion above amounted to unlawful  sex  discrimination  because  a  considerably
lesser proportion of women than men had such experience. (The applicants themselves  had  no  such  experience.)   The  industrial
tribunal upheld their claim and the employer appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (’EAT’).
3. WHYTE ON APPEAL
The EAT dismissed the employer’s appeal.  They noted that the  preponderance  of  women  in  basic  grade  social  work  posts  in
contrast to promoted posts was ’so overwhelming’ that it was ’inevitable’ that any requirement  for  prior  management  experience
would disadvantage women.  Further, they upheld the industrial tribunal’s finding that the criterion and the weight  placed  upon  it
by the employer was not justified: this was only a first level managerial post and  so  it  was  wrong  to  attach  such  importance  to
previous experience in contrast to other qualities, including, aptitude.
However the main - and most interesting - issue concerned  the  statutory  phrase  ’requirement  or
condition’.  As we have seen, since 1983 (Perera) the Court of Appeal has maintained that  s.  1(1),  SDA  demands
that the defendant employer must have applied a ’requirement or condition’ in the sense of an ’absolute bar’ to the job.
It will be recalled that in Whyte the employer stated that management training and supervisory experience was  ’desirable’,
rather than say ’necessary’ or ’essential’.  Thus it may have been possible for an applicant without such experience to  still  get  the
job.  In other words the criterion did not amount to an ’absolute bar’ to the job and, according to Perera, fell  outside  the  scope  of
the Act.  The EAT held otherwise, for two reasons.
First, the industrial tribunal found that although the criterion was expressed as a ’mere preference’ in practice
it operated as an absolute bar.  They noted that one of the complainants would have got the  post  but  for  her  lack  of  supervisory
experience.  This distinction between form and substance was a finding of fact which the EAT - as an appellate  tribunal  -  did  not
feel able to interfere with.  Not only is this a refreshingly positive and realistic approach,  it  should  be  the  correct  one.   The  Act
demands that a requirement is applied.  It does not demand that one is merely expressed.  Yet in  most  cases  on  this  point  courts
have failed to look behind the form of a criterion, allowing employers to avoid the anti-discrimination  legislation.   One  exception
is Jones v University of Manchester ([1993] ICR 474) where the English Court of Appeal took a similar line to the EAT  in  Whyte:
they refused to interfere with an industrial tribunals’ finding  that  a  criterion  (’candidates  aged  between  27-35  years  would  be
preferred’) was in practice applied as an absolute bar.  However that decision was confined  to  a  finding  of  fact  and  in  no  way
undermined the authority of Perera, which was applied.
On that ground alone the decision could rest.  But the EAT went on to approve a line of  reasoning
taken by counsel for the complainants.  Lord Johnston recalled:
            ’It was counsel’s essential submission that one should not interpret the words "requirement
or  condition"  on  any  narrow  or  restricted  basis,  having  regard  to  the   fact   that   the
legislation was based upon European Directive No 207/76 [the Equal Treatment Directive]
covering   sex   discrimination   which   therefore   fell   to   be   treated   differently    from
discrimination on grounds of race.  Since the employers here were part of the emanation of
the State, this tribunal, and indeed the industrial tribunal, could apply the Directive without
reference to the legislation; but, in any event, if the legislation required it to be  interpreted
on any particular basis it should be consistent with the purpose of  the  Directive  -  the  so-
called "purposive approach" which can be found supported by the House of Lords in  Litster
v Forth Dry Dock Engineering Co Ltd [1990] 1 AC 546.  He submitted that Perera had been rightly criticised even in the
context of race relations (Meer v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1988]  IRLR  399,  CA),  which  was  all  the
more reason for not applying it to the scope of sex discrimination.  The proper approach  should  be  whether  or  not  the
factor, to give it a neutral phrase, hindered women as opposed to men in the particular context,  here  the  application  for
the post in question.’
Lord Johnston concluded:
            ’In many ways this was  a  classic  situation  of  indirect  sex  discrimination,  with  mostly
women in basic grade posts, and mostly  men  in  promoted  management  posts  -  a  vivid
example of what the Act and its forerunners in the United States set out to eliminate, ie those
practices which had a disproportionate impact on women and were not justifiable for other reasons...’
4. ANALYSIS
This  judgment  was  unusual  in  that  Lord  Johnston  adopted  the   words   of   counsel   for   the
complainants as part of his reasoning.  And the decision was made without any apparent reference
to conflicting authority or the minor errors in counsel’s submission.
(a) The Errors in Whyte
Of the minor failings the first was that the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 was not based upon the Equal
Treatment Directive.  The Directive was not even adopted until 1976  (OJ  L39/76)  and  came  into  force  in  1978.   Whereas  the
Directive is solely concerned with employment matters the SDA covers education and the supply of services, goods,  facilities  and
premises as well as employment.  See also Duke v GEC Reliance [1988] AC 618, HL.  However, although the proposition (that the
SDA was based on the Directive) is mistaken the conclusion deriving from it is not.  According to  the  European  Court  of  Justice
(’ECJ’) domestic courts should interpret domestic legislation as far as possible to accord with a Directive whether the domestic law
in question was enacted before or after the Directive (Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimintacion Case C 106/89
[1990] 1 CMLR 305.
Second, Litster was cited as authority for the  ’purposive’  approach  to  interpretation  of  the  domestic  legislation.   Whereas
Litster is an adequate authority, there are more appropriate ones.  In Whyte the Equal Treatment  Directive  was  directly  effective.
This is because the employer was an ’emanation of the State’ who was thus bound to implement the Directive.  However in  Litster
the employer was a private party and  so  not  obliged  to  implement  the  Directive.   That  was  a  case  where  the  Directive  was
indirectly effective.  More appropriate House of Lords authorities would have been Garland v  British  Rail  Engineering  [1983]  2
AC 751 and Pickstone v Freeman [1989] AC 66.  The principle is the  same  though:  so  far  as  it  is  possible  to  do  so  domestic
legislation should interpreted to accord with the wording and purpose of the Directive.  In cases of direct  effect  only,  if  the  court
cannot interpret the statute to accord with the Directive they may simply ignore the statute and apply the  Directive  itself  -  that  is
the principle of supremacy of EC law: Factortame v Secretary of State for Transport [1990] 2 AC 85, HL.  In  Whyte  no  authority
was cited for that proposition.
(b) Conflicting Authorities: Does Perera apply to the SDA?
The  second  shortcoming  concerns  the  absence  of  the  conflicting  authorities.  One   of   those
authorities was in fact Meer which was cited in support of the decision to disregard Perera.  Meer was heard in 1988, some
five years after the Perera decision.  The facts were broadly similar to Perera and so the Court felt bound  by  precedent  to  follow
Perera.  However only one (of three) Court of Appeal judges expressed a doubt over the correctness of Perera;  Balcombe, LJ said
obiter that had he not been bound there were ’strong arguments’ that Perera ’may not be consistent with the object of  the  Act’  (at
403).  On the other hand Dillon, LJ  expressed  no  opinion  on  Perera  whilst  Staughton,  LJ  positively  endorsed  it  stating  that
otherwise s. 1(1)(b) ’would have such an extraordinary wide and capricious effect’ (at 403).
Put simply Meer is a conflicting case containing one obiter dictum, which may weaken its authority but which  cannot  destroy
it.  It cannot be said, as the EAT did, that the speeches Meer, taken as a whole, criticised Perera; on balance they supported it.
In Whyte, Perera was distinguished as being a case concerning the Race Relations Act  and  not  the  Sex  Discrimination  Act.   Of
course Meer could be distinguished that basis too.  However the EAT did not consider a number of cases where the construction  in
Perera was applied to the Sex Discrimination Act.  For instance: in the Court of Appeal,  Jones  v  University  of  Manchester  (see
above) and in Employment Appeal  Tribunals,  Meikle  v  Nottingham  City  Council  EAT/249/92,  (Transcript)  14th  April  1994,
London Borough of Greenwich v Robinson EAT/745/94, (Transcript) 21st November 1995, Mutemasango v  Staffline  Recruitment
Ltd EAT/517/95, (Transcript) 13th May 1996 and Connelly v Strathclyde Regional Council EAT/1039/94, (Transcript)  8th  March
1995.  This last case, where a Scottish EAT held (reluctantly) that they were bound by Perera, was in  fact  cited  by  the  employer
but not dealt with in Lord Johnston’s speech.
(c) Conflicting Authorities: The status of EC law
There are several judicial statements asserting that section 1(1), of the Sex Discrimination  Act  is  unaffected  by  EC  law.   These
assertions are responses to Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority [1994] ICR 112.  In this case a speech therapist made  a  claim  of
equal pay for work of equal value.  She compared her pay with that of a pharmacist who, it was accepted did work of  equal  value.
The vast majority of speech therapists were women and most of the pharmacists were men.  The pay of  both  workers  was  set  by
collective bargaining: each group (that is speech therapists and pharmacists) having a  separate  agreement.   Therefore  this  was  a
case of indirect discrimination.
Now the relevant domestic legislation in this case is the Equal Pay Act and the Sex Discrimination
Act.  The Equal Pay Act provides, inter alia, that there shall be equal pay for work of equal value.   But  only  the  Sex
Discrimination Act provides a definition of indirect  discrimination  (s.  1(1)(b),  above).   Article  119  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  is
directly effective here as well: See Jenkins v Kingsgate (Case 96/80) 1981 ECR 911.
The Health Authority argued, inter alia, that the Equal Pay Act was but a detailed exposition of the  Sex  Discrimination
Act; an equal pay claim may be based  upon  direct  or  indirect  discrimination.   In  either  case  a  court  should  look  to  the  Sex
Discrimination Act for a definition of the type of discrimination in question.  Therefore, the Health Authority  argued,  in  an  equal
pay case based on indirect discrimination, the applicant must show that there was a requirement or  condition  (as  stipulated  by  s.
1(1)(b), SDA) applied by them, which caused the variation in pay.  No such requirement had been applied to any  speech  therapist.
Doctor Enderby could train and qualify as a pharmacist and receive the preferable remuneration.  There was no barrier in  her  way
because she was a woman.  The only cause of the lower pay was her decision to enter a less well paid profession.
The case went all the way to the ECJ where it was held that in equal pay claims under Article  119
it was not necessary to show that the employer had applied a ’requirement or  condition’.   Thus  it
was  not  possible  to  import  into  the  British  Equal  Pay  Act  1970  the  definition   of   indirect
discrimination from the Sex Discrimination Act, even though the two  Acts  form  ’a  single  code’
(Shields v Coome Holdings [1978] ICR 1159 CA and Rainey v Greater Glasgow Health Board [1987] AC 224, HL) and  only  the
SDA provides a definition of indirect discrimination.
Clearly Enderby is authority for the proposition that the element ’applies a requirement or condition’ does not apply to  cases  of
equal pay - under Article 119 or the EPA.  But does this principle of Enderby extend to cases brought under the Sex Discrimination
Act and even the Race Relations Act?  Judges in three English cases have commented  on  the  effect  of  Enderby.   They  have  all
confined it to equal pay claims only.
In the first case, British Coal v Smith ([1994] ICR 810), Balcombe, LJ speaking for the Court of Appeal stated:
            ’In our judgement, the result of Enderby is that a clear  distinction  has  to  be  made  between  the  ’objective
justification’ required by Article 119 of the Treaty... and the separate question whether indirect discrimination as  defined
in the British statute, which requires the positive application of a requirement or condition,  is  shown  to  be  "justifiable"
pursuant to section (1)(b)(ii) of the [Sex Discrimination] Act of 1975.’
In Ratcliffe v North Yorkshire County Council ([1995] 3 All ER 597, HL), in a speech with which the  other  Law  Lords  agreed,
Lord Slynn (without referring directly to Enderby) stated:
            ’In my opinion the 1970 [Equal Pay] Act must be interpreted in its amended form  without
bringing in the distinction between so-called "direct" and "indirect" discrimination.’
The third English case to comment on the effect of Enderby was Bhudi v  IMI  Refiners  [1994]  ICR  307,  EAT.
This was a claim under the Sex Discrimination Act where the Equal Treatment Directive had indirect effect only.  In  this  case  the
respondents  employed  full-time  (mainly  men)  and  part-time  (mainly  women)  cleaners.   They  made  the   part-time   cleaners
redundant because: (a) they were administered by a  separate  department;  (b)  they  worked  out-of-office  hours,  unlike  the  full-
timers; and (c) it was (therefore) cheaper to contract  out  the  part-time  work.   This  adversely  affected  women.   The  employers
argued that no ’requirement’ had been applied for the  purposes  of  section  1(1)(b)  of  the  Sex  Discrimination  Act.   Mrs  Bhudi
contended that the result of Enderby was that there was no longer a need to prove that there was a requirement  in  the  sense  of  an
’absolute bar’.
Mummery, J rejected Mrs Bhudi’s contentions on two  grounds.   First,  he  stated  that  Enderby  was
confined to cases on equal pay brought under Article 119.  Second (at 315), the Tribunal was bound by House of  Lords’  authority
that it was open to a domestic court to interpret a statute in accordance with a directive, as interpreted by the  ECJ,  ’only  if  it  was
possible to do so’.  But as the phrase in section 1(1)(b) SDA was ’not open to  divergent  interpretations’  this  could  not  be  done.
(Mummery,  J  cited  for  support  the  House  of  Lords’  decisions  in  Duke  v  Reliance  Systems  [1988]  AC  618,   Finnegan   v
Clowney [1990] 2 AC 407 and Webb v Emo Air Cargo [1988] 1 WLR 49.  The judgement did however recognise  (at  315)  that  at
some time in the future a higher court (’probably the ECJ’) may hold that the Equal Treatment Directive applies to all cases of  sex
discrimination and that the domestic legislation would have to be amended accordingly.)  Thus it is  clear  that  the  English  judges
are stoutly defending any attacks on the Perera doctrine based on Enderby.
It would seem then that the state of the authorities before the tribunals  in  Whyte  were  this.   The  notion
’requirement or condition’ does not apply in claims of equal pay where that claim is based upon indirect sex discrimination.  In  all
other cases of indirect discrimination (ie under the SDA, RRA and presumably the  Fair  Employment  (NI)  Act)  the  complainant
must show that there was a ’requirement or condition’ in the form of an ’absolute bar’: Perera is still good law although it  is  clear
that this anomaly is under pressure from Europe.
(d) Arguments to Support Whyte
The EAT in Whyte failed to consider any of these conflicting authorities.  If they were faced with them, could they  have,  with
reasons, come to the same decision?
First it is clear that in case where the Directive has direct  effect  that  Directive  will  prevail  over
conflicting domestic law.  So the next stage is to inquire as to  whether  the  Directive  demands  a
’requirement or condition’ in the form of an ’absolute bar’.  There are no ECJ cases on that  point.
However the Directive does not expressly demand a ’requirement’.   Further,  in  related  fields  of
discrimination law the ECJ has declined to make the  distinction  between  a  ’preference’  and  an
’absolute bar’: Enderby (under A 119, equal pay) and Ingetraut Scholz v  Opera  Universitaria  di  Cagliari  Case  C-419/92
[1994] ECR 1-507 (under A 48, which prohibits discrimination based on nationality between workers of Member States).   Thus  it
seems highly unlikely that one could import such a notion into  the  Directive.   Accordingly  the  EAT  in  Whyte  were  correct  to
assume that the Directive could offer a remedy if the domestic law could not.
The next point is the interpretive one.  The EAT felt that it was possible  to  interpret  the  SDA  in
accordance with the Directive.  This is, in many ways, a more important point.  This is because  in
cases where the employer is not an emanation of the State, the Directive shall only have indirect effect.  In other words  a
court could not apply the Directive.  The only recourse to EC law is by interpreting section 1(1) in accordance  with  the  Directive.
In Whyte the EAT thought that that was possible.  In Bhudi they  thought  that  it  was  not.   The  better  view  was  held  in  Whyte.
Logically, a criterion expressed as a ’preference’ is a requirement: it is an absolute bar to gaining an advantage in the job  selection
procedure.  This interpretation in no way distorts the statutory words and accords  with  the  purpose  of  the  domestic  statute  and,
more importantly, with the Directive.
There is support for  this  view  in  Australia,  where  there  is  similarly  worded  legislation.   The
Federal Court of Western Australia refused to follow Perera in Secretary of Department of Foreign  Affairs  and
Trade And: Styles ((1989) 88 ALR 621, see also Waters v Public  Transport  Corporation  (1991)  173  CLR  349,  High  Court  of
Australia).
5. CONCLUSION
The tribunals in Whyte are to be commended for being the first to confront the absurdity which is Perera.  As  we  have  seen
the decision can be supported on three grounds.  (1) The Equal Treatment Directive, which does not demand an ’absolute bar’ was,
in this case, directly effective.  It was thus open to the tribunal to disregard conflicting  UK  law  and  simply  apply  the  Directive.
Factortame is authority for that.  (2) In substance - if not in form - it was possible to conclude that  an  ’absolute  bar’  to  selection
had been applied.  Jones is Court of Appeal authority for that.  (3)  It was possible to construe s. 1(1)(b), SDA  in  accordance  with
the Equal Treatment Directive  without  distorting  the  statutory  words.   The  construction  would  be  that  s.  1(1)(b)  includes  a
requirements needed to be put at an advantage in the selection process.
However, in the short term, the case will present problems.  The absence of citation of  conflicting
cases and miner errors undermine its authority.  In any future hearing on similar facts Whyte could  be
easily distinguished for those reasons.  So, at present, the case may be  of little help to claimants.  But  that  does  not  mean  to  say
that it favours employers -  for the law is now uncertain.  Clearly an appeal is  needed  to  restore  certainty  and,  one  might  hope,
drive the absurdity of Perera out of British law for good.  As Perera is a Court of Appeal decision, the  only  place  for  that  is  the
House of Lords, or even the European Court of Justice.
Post Script.
Since Whyte the European Commission has published the Burden of Proof Directive (97/80/EC).  Article 2 provides a  definition
of  indirect  discrimination,  which  ’shall  exist  where  an  apparently  neutral  provision,  criterion  or   practice   disadvantages   a
substantially higher proportion of the members of one sex...’.  Clearly Whyte accords with this definition and Perera does not.  The
British Government are obliged to implement the Directive by 1st January 2001 and in doing so they will abolish Perera.
